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CHAPTER TWELVE
SOCIAL REGULATION
Americans today are forgetting their cultural traditions and losing
their moral consensus.
simply one or the other.

The problem is both religious and political, not
A key assumption of constitutional government

is that self-governing individuals will fulfill their civic
responsibilities in cooperative service.

This assumption rests upon the

Christian concept of vocation: "And whatsoever ye do, do it heartily, as
to the Lord . . . " (Col. 3:23).

The social consequence of the faithful

application of this sense of calling to all areas of life is the growth
of a plurality of authoritative institutions: civil, ecclesiastical,
familial, educational, industrial, commercial, and professional.
As R. J. Rushdoony has noted as a matter of historical reality: "No
society can allow its central dogma to be threatened."

1

The American

constitutional system is founded on the Reformation ideal of individual
self-government.

It is expressed in the cherished rights of free

speech, religious liberty, and private property.

But the center of

American life has been shifting so dramatically that many of the old
customs of local self-government, like the town meeting, are becoming
cultural artifacts fit only for display.

Relics of the dimly remembered

past become grist for the cultural pulp mills.

Any standard of value

other than an ultimately hedonistic utilitarianism is apt to be rejected
as an intolerable imposition.

2

The gain in sociability seems to involve
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a corresponding loss of independent moral judgment and conviction.
The success of a pluralistic constitution depends on the strong
self-motivation and, as Justice Jackson suggested in 1943, a respect for
the faith of the people.

Even a minority of self-governing individuals

can provide the necessary leadership to maintain free institutions.

But

authority is too often associated in the public mind with decisions
handed down from on high.

The quest for certainty can lead to a

proliferation of regulations and a growing fatalism that destroys
personal initiative.

One of Franz Kafka's parables is instructive in

this regard:
They were offered the choice between becoming kings or the couriers
of kings. The way children would, they all wanted to be couriers.
Therefore there are only couriers who hurry about the world,
shouting to each other--since there are no kings--messages that
have become meaningless. They would like to put an end to this
miserable l~fe of theirs but they dare not because of their oaths
of service.
By contrast, the theology that built American social institutions on a
foundation of civil liberty regards every believer as a prophet, a
priest, and a king directly accountable to God.

It is a very different

attitude and it sustains a very different life.
The alternative to institutional pluralism is elite rule of some
sort.

Its emergence has been fought every step of the way throughout

American history, as a illustration by Max Weber helps confirm:
The opportunities for democracy and individualism would look very
bad today were we to rely upon the lawful effects of material
interests for their development. For the development of material
interests points, as distincly as possible, in the opposite
direction: in the American "benevolent feudalism," in the so-called
"welfare institutions" of Germany, in the Russian factory
constitution . . . everywhere the house is ready-made for a new
servitude. It only waits for the tempo of technical economic
"progress" to slow down and for rent to triumph over profit. The
latter victory, joined with the exhaustion of the remaining free
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soil and free market, will make the masses docile. Then man will
move into the house of servitude. At the same time, the increasing
complexity of the economy, the partial governmentalization of
economic activities, the territorial expansion of the
population--these processes create ever-new work for the clerks, an
ever-new specialization of functions, and expert vocational
training and administration. All this means caste.
Those American workers who were against the "Civil Service Reform"
knew what they were about. They wished to be governed by parvenus
of doubtful morals rather than by a certified caste of mandarins.
4
But their protest was in vain.
James Madison was particularly astute in his analysis of the
dynamics of political power and its tendency to be concentrated in
official hands:
It has been remarked that there is a tendency in all Governments to
an augmentation of power at the expence of liberty. But the remark
as usually understood does not appear to me well founded. Power
when it has attained a certain degree of energy and independence
goes on generally to further degrees of relaxation, until the
abuses of liberty beget a sudden transition to an undue degree of
power. 5
Those who refuse to govern themselves and to participate in public
affairs invariably leave that responsibility to others.

Public apathy

on any appreciable scale undercuts the basis for consensus and
cooperation.

But no basis for national excellence has ever been

discovered that can substitute for the personal character of its
citizens.

The abuse of liberty appears to be a major catalyst for the

augmentation of power but, as Madison intimated, beyond a critical point
the power will tend to become self-augmenting.
Churches must live in this new political and social environment
which is, to a large degree, both the effect and the cause of a
multiplication of fiscal and social regulations.

This chapter is

devoted to an exploration of some of the problems and conflicts that
have resulted as both church and state have sought to reconstitute their
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programs in terms of new political, social, economic, and religious
conditions.

The variety of regulations and points of conflict is

immense: fund-raising rules, lobbying disclosure laws, collective
bargaining, detachment of auxiliary ministries, curriculum content,
teaching qualifications, unemployment compensation, dormitory and
off-campus residence policies, hygiene instruction, coeducational sports
requirements, minority enrollment quotas, employment and admissions
statistics reporting requirements, sampling surveys of churches and
church agencies by the Bureau of the Census that require voluminous
information, grand jury interrogation of church workers about internal
church affairs, use of clergy and missionaries as informants by
intelligence agencies, subpoenas of church records in civil and criminal
suits, conservatorship orders affecting adult members of religious
groups, withholding of tax exemptions from churches for failure to
comply with public policy, and various definitions of what constitutes a
ministry for various purposes.

6

The list is far from comprehensive but

the central problem is well stated by Allan C. Carlson:
Religious organizations are seeing their activities and autonomy
compromised indirectly by governmental definitions that confine
unrestricted "church activity" to an ever smaller circle . . . .
Joining most other private institutions, the churches are facing
for the first time the discomfiting adjustments demanded by a
bureaucratic state pursuing a set of abstract policy goals. Social
regulation has spread far beyond its once limited domain. The
government's commitment to an "affirmative" vision of individual
and group equality and to augmented collective security, together
~ith state protection of a new set of "rights" un¥nown several
decades ago, is altering the religious community.
Church Polity and Doctrines
Courts have generally intervened into internal church affairs for
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one or more of the following reasons: disputes over the use or
disposition of church property, allegations of force or fraud, or
specific health and safety concerns.
The role of the judiciary as an arbiter between the social
regulatory policies of the state and the free exercise of church
doctrine is not a new one.

What is new is the growth of affirmative as

well as prohibitive rules directly affecting churches.

To their credit,

many courts have resisted this trend and have frequently dismissed suits
brought against churches by public agencies simply for what William Ball
has called "hasty overbreadth in regulating."

8

But demands for church

files, special permits, and employment statistics frequently lead to a
hardening of battle lines.

Typically, confrontations may be the result

of mistakes, ignorance, suspicion, or alarm on either side.

But many

disagreements appear to arise from the sometimes different logic by
which church and state pursue their professed goals.
The major precedent for judicial intervention into church property
disputes, the Watson case of 1871, involved issues that anticipated the
more recent social conflicts which have helped define new areas of
social regulation.

As Leo Pfeffer has noted:

In 1861, at the outset of the Civil War, the General Assembly of
the Presbyterian Church, reversing a responsa of 1845 that slavery
was not sinful, became an articulate advocate of the Union cause;
Southern and border state members objected vainly that it was
violating an article of the Confession of Faith that "Synods and
councils are to handle or conclude nothing but that which is
ecclesiastical, and are not to i~termeddle with civil affairs which
concern the Commonwealth . . . . "
Following the Civil War, ministers and missionaries from Southern and
border states were interrogated about their views on slavery as a
stipulation for continued employment.

Several property disputes grew
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out of schisms in some of the border states.

In its Watson ruling, the

Court held that the decision of the highest ecclesiastical court in a
denomination should be considered binding by the civil courts.

This

represented an attempt to do justice to the differences of church
polities, of which there are three basic varieties: episcopal,
presbyterian, and congregational.
But the courts must first determine the nature of the governing
hierarchy before they can defer to the highest church authority.

In

some cases, there may be a genuine disagreement concerning the true
locus of authority in any strictly legal sense.
such confusion, injustices may still result.

Even where there is no

In many cases the dispute

is the result of a capture of the church hierarchy by a particular
faction, as in Watson and Dedham cases, or by a political body allegedly
hostile to church doctrine, as in the Kedroff and Kreshik cases.
Out of dissatisfaction with the Watson approach, other solutions
have been tried or suggested, the most recent of which is the
neutral-principles doctrine announced in the Hull Church case and
amplified in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).

As a result of the

latter decision, courts may examine documentary evidence to determine
whether the property of a local congregation in expressly held in trust
for the parent church.
settled.

But it is an area in which the law is far from

10

Fraud is another area which the courts handle gingerly.

The

Ballard decision of 1944 established that courts may not question the
validity of articles of faith.
examined in a court of law.

Religious teachings per se may not be

But common law fraud still covers cases
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that involve misrepresentation of material facts.

But what cannot be

done is to require prior approval for religious appeals.
advice is still caveat emptor.

The best

11

The multipli-cation of -new religious cults has -done more- than anything to stimulate efforts to regulate religious practices, just as
religious tax exemptions have been discredited by fraudulent uses.

Over

the years, the press has tended to concentrate on the horror stories
with accounts of how one or another cult has endeavored to control the
ancestral waters of Gloucester fishermen, capture political power in a
major city, incorporate its own city, place poisonous snakes in the
mailboxes of opponents, raid the files of government agencies, obtain
new converts by using sophisticated brainwashing techniques, conduct
ritual sacrifices, or embezzle millions of dollars from unsuspecting
banks, airlines, and ordinary investors.

The stories are often based on

unimpeachable sources and may be supplemented by countless similar ones
that never reach the headlines.

Reactions to the Jonestown tragedy

epitomized the helpless outrage shared by the general public but it is
difficult any longer to know where to point the finger of blame in a day
when mass murder is a regular part of the evening news.

Religion is so

much at the center of so many conflicts that it is easy to blame
religion.

But one may as well blame politics or human nature.

The

destructiveness pent up in the human soul is being treated more as an
elemental force of nature than as an expressions of culpable moral
depravity.

The definition of human nature or--for that matter--religion

has passed beyond any meaningful set of distinctives.
Anti-conversion legislation, deprogramming, and court-appointed

543
guardians for adult members of various religious groups have caused
consternation among civil libertarians.

New York Governor Hugh Carey

has twice vetoed bills that would have authorized state courts to
appoint temporary guardians for adults who showed signs of
"psychological deterioration'' after exposure to a religious cult.

12

But

it is difficult to make the earlier distinction between religion and
cultus when the one has come to include the other in the Court's most
recent definitions.

In the absence of an accepted standard of religious

practice, the legislatures, law enforcement agencies, and courts have
had to grope for a working definition by trial and error.

A likely

consequence of this inclusion of such a variety of beliefs and practices
under the rubric of religion is to further encourage "hasty overbreadth
in regulation" and efforts to extend applications of the police power
through test cases.

Like the "intractable problem of pornography,"

demands for the suppression of cultic activity have challenged the
ingenuity of civil authorities.
Despite attempts by some state agencies to regulate the financial
transactions of churches, the courts have generally resisted such
encroachments of state power into internal church affairs.

13

In

Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979), a federal
court of appeals rejected an attempt by the Department of Consumer
Affairs in Puerto Rico to subpoena documents of the Roman Catholic
Church during an investigation of the operating costs of parochial
schools.
Meanwhile, churches themselves have been developing ways to police
each other as a response to some well-publicized cases involving
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embezzlement of church receipts and mismanagement of retirement funds.

14

One result was the formation of the Evangelical Council for Financial
Accountability in 1979.

15

Business and Political Activity
Business uses of church property and unrelated business income of
churches are now subject to taxation, although some loopholes remain.

16

Churches which are involved in business activities are advised to
distinguish their business records from other records that relate to the
avowedly religious mission of the church.

Disputes over whether a

particular activity--such as a regular bingo night, a special
fundraising dinner, or a publishing operation--generates "unrelated
business income" is a source of much litigation.
have been held to be commercial enterprises.

Some alleged churches

On the other hand, some

acknowledged churches have had their tax exemptions revoked for
indulging in too many activities deemed secular in nature.

17

Communal

religious organizations, particularly those which endeavor to be
self-sustaining, have run afoul various regulations, including
restrictive zoning codes, minimum wage laws, and income tax
.
t s. 18
requlremen

As in many other areas of constitutional law, the scope

of free exercise protections and lawful prohibitions or requirements is
being determined virtually on ·a case by case basis.
Some restrictions on political activities by churches have a long
history, perhaps in part because of the important role churches played
during the War for Independence and the partisan politics of the period
immediately afterward.

At the time the Constitution was adopted, four
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states--Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia--excluded
ministers from the legislature. 19

This custom persisted in Tennessee

until 1978, when the Supreme Court invalidated the restriction in a
split opinion in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).

Chief Justice

Burger considered the exclusion an unconstitutional restraint on
religious conduct.

Justice Brennan instead invoked the Torcaso rule by

treating the exclusion as a restraint on religious belief.

But the

problem of distinguishing between belief and conduct--and determining
the bounds of the latter--remains largely unresolved.
Lobbying and electioneering restrictions also remain points of
controversy.

Religious organizations are not currently permitted to

directly intervene in political campaigns.

They may not endorse,

oppose, compare, or rate candidates and may not publish or distribute
voter education guides that indicate a bias regarding certain candidates
or issues.

On the other hand, they may speak out on public issues where

religious principles are involved and engage in lobbying where their tax
status or existence is at stake.

But the rules are very fluid.

An

Internal Revenue Service ruling of October 14, 1980 amplified its
earlier rule against publication of congressional voting records by
churches and other §501(t)(3) organizations as follows: ''Certain 'voter'
education' activities conducted in a non-partisan manner may not
constitute prohibited political activities • . . . n

20

The vagueness of such rules tends to have a chilling effect which
just as effectively silences many churches as an outright prohibition
against addressing public issues.

The involvement of churches in voter

registration drives during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s may
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have inspired an administrative tightening of the rules but a new level
of political activism among Christian fundamentalists is likely to keep
the political divisiveness issue alive.

21

A coalition of public charities successfully induced Congress to
pass the Tax Reform Act of 1976, which attempted to clarify the limits
of permissible lobbying.

But recently, the Supreme Court denied in

Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 103 S.Ct. 1997 (1983), that a
nonprofit organization enjoying a §501(c)(3) exemption has any
constitutional right to lobby, despite the fact that veterans
organizations under the same classification are permitted to do so.
There is still confusion about the extent to which churches may be
involved in political activities under the Internal Revenue Code rules.
But the Supreme Court itself has lent some support to free expression by
churches in its Walz decision:
Adherents of particular faiths and individual churches frequently
take strong positions on public issues including, as this case
reveals in the several briefs amici, vigorous advocacy of legal or
constitutional positions. Of course, churches as much as secular
bodies and private citizens have that right (397 U.S. 664, 670).
Subsequent lower court rulings, however, have cast some doubt on
the extent and nature of this right.

In Christian Echoes National

Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 864 (1973), a federal court revoked that ministry's tax
exemption because of alleged lobbying and electioneering:
In light of the fact that tax exemption is a privilege, a matter of
grace rather than right, we hold that the limitations contained in
Section 501 (c) (3) . . . do not deprive Christian Echoes of its
constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech. The taxpayer may
engage in all such activities without restraint, subject, however,
to withholding of the exemption, or, in the alternative, the
taxpayer may refrain from such exemptions and obtain the privilege
of exemption.
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Whether or not Congress or the Supreme Court ever intended
religious tax exemptions to be treated as a matter of grace, this view
has effectively become the determining one.

Since churches are not

liable for taxes, they are not required to apply for an exemption.

But

their status as churches may be challenged and church records
subpoenaed.

The treatment of a tax exemption as a privilege raises

establishment clause concerns despite the availability of alternative
classifications if a religious organization fails to be recognized under
a particular one.
Even if exemptions are regarded merely as an "act of grace,"
however, stipulations regarding political activity by churches, for
instance, do entail First Amendment issues of the kind the Court has yet
to specifically address.

But as Justice Brennan remarked in the

Sherbert case: "It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of
religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of
conditions upon a benefit or privilege'' (374 U.S. 398, 404).

It seems

highly inappropriate for a government agency to be able to dangle an
exemption before a church as an enticement.

Like entrapment, the

practice suffers from a serious lack of perspective about the proper
role of government in the lives of its citizens.

The realm of religious

free expression and civil liberty in general is a vulnerable one if the
enjoyment of lawful freedoms can be impeded by such stipulations.
Auxiliary Ministries
Two axioms may be said to govern American church law.
that congregational polities tend to be favored.

The first is

The second is that the
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scope of the church's religious mission tends to be minimized.
Historically, this represents the dominance of theological nominalism, a
tendency that characterized the English dissenting tradition and
assisted in the birth of modern western law.

The coexistence of

congregational and hierarchical church polities in America, however, has
necessitated the development of special rules to help offset this
natural legal bias.

Much of the tension in tax laws and social

regulations grows out of this religious variety, making any neat
distinction between sacred and secular matters difficult to take for
granted.
As a result, some ministries are incorporated separately from the
parent churches in order to enjoy full advantage of the law.

But along

with the special difficulties naturally entailed by exceptions and
exemptions, the compartmentalization of church functions often creates
new problems, as many churches have found in regard to their so-called
auxiliary ministries.

When the Treasury Department proposed new

regulations for integrated auxiliaries in 1976, church-related
hospitals, orphanages, old age homes, and elementary schools were
excluded from the list of qualifying ministries.
opposition and hearings were held.

Churches united in

Some adjustments in the rules were

made, summarized as follows by Charles M. Whelan:
The final regulations explicitly recognize that, to be an
integrated auxiliary of a church, a church-related organization
must first possess a legal identity in its own right as a section
501 (c) (3) organization. Thus, an organization directly owned and
operated by a church is not an integrated auxiliary but a npartn of
the church. Secondly, the final regulations abandon the npurpose
and functionn test stated in the proposed regulations and
substitute a new nprincipal activityn test. Under the purposed
regulations, the primary function of an integrated auxiliary had to
be to carry out the tenets, functions and principles of faith of a
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church, and the organization's activities had to directly promote
religious activity among the members of the church. Under the
final regulations, these criteria do not apply, but the "principal
activity" of the organizations must be "exclusively religious."
Thirdly, the final regulations exempt all church-related elem2~tary
and secondary schools from filing annual information returns.
Despite these adjustments, anomalies remain and the application of
the rules is being tested in the courts on a case by case basis.

In

addition, the assumption that auxiliary ministries are somehow
incidental to and thus detachable from from regular church functions
makes them a source of perplexity even to the taxing authorities.
Section 6033(a)(2)(A) (i) of the Internal Revenue Code provides a
mandatory exception to the general tax filing requirement only for
churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations
of churches.

Religious organizations that fail to qualify under one of

these exceptions are for that reason also apt to be subjected to
additional taxation and regulation at all levels of government.
Perceptions vary as to what kinds of ministries qualify as
integrated auxiliaries or as parts of churches.

Physical proximity to

the main church sanctuary is not a determinant.

Some ministries may

encompass physical facilities that are located in different cities and
states.

This adds to the complexity of the problem.

The historic withdrawal of many, if not most, churches from these
areas of ministry in deference to comparable state-operated programs
appears to be behind the problem.

As Lynn Buzzard and Samuel Ericsson

contend:
Up until the twentieth century, American churches provided most of
the assistance to the vulnerable in our society. But with the
growth of the welfare state, many churches shifted the costs of
such programs to the broader tax base so they could serve more
"spiritual" needs. This trend has been reversed in the past
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decade. Many churches are once again providing for the poor, the
needy, the elderly. But now the church is caught in a tension
between God's mandate and a government perspective 1hat seeks to
2
confine the church to a "building with a steeple."
The causes are more complex than any brief summary can suggest, but the
withdrawal of churches from many social welfare ministries and the
involvement of the state in those ministries may be attributed in part
to specific theological crosscurrents during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.

One segment of the religious community

actively sought a growing involvement by the state in programs of social
reconstruction.

Another segment reacted against the doctrinal

innovations of the former and chose to place a renewed emphasis on the
fundamentals of the faith.

Both tended to lose sight of the

comprehensiveness of the faith.

The religious community, which at times

has achieved results through cooperative enterprises, became further
fragmented.

24

Once started, new programs and organizations tend to acquire a life
of their own.

Often they survive the loss of their original purpose and

clientele by filling some other niche, much like holding companies.
Even in a free marketplace, it is difficult to recover a market once a
competitor achieves a commanding position unless the market conditions
change or the competitor fails to keep pace.

This is doubly true if the

competitor is a tax-supported institution with a vested interest in
maintaining its advantage.
their employees out of work.

Few organizations deliberately seek to put
On the contrary, they may be expected to

maximize their advantage by supporting a high degree of regulation.
The courts are ill-equipped to redress any but the most egregious
examples of political intrusion under the guise of the public interest.

551
Regulations may increase even as the capacity to enforce them decreases.
The courts, as a result, have become overburdened with litigation.
Under the Equal Access to Justice Act of 1981, litigants may now recover
the legal costs they incur if the courts find that a federal agency has
acted against them without substantial justification.

By 1983,

according to the Washington law firm of Gammon and Grange, "only about
100 litigants have applied for reimbursement since the act went into
effect even though Uncle Sam lost an estimated 12,000 civil lawsuits
last year alone."

25

Lack of publicity about the law was said to blame.

In the absence of clear guidelines, the courts have shown little
consistency in dealing with such ministries as hospitals, homes for
unwed mothers, and children's homes.

The most publicized case of this

sort was the successful ten year court battle by the late Rev. Lester
Roloff over licensure of his church's homes for delinquent children.
Rev. Roloff lost an early round in 1979 after the Department of Public
Welfare in Texas brought suit to force him to comply with the Child-Care
Licensing Act.

He refused to do so for two stated reasons: first,

licensure placed the state in authority over a Christian ministry and,
second, it implied state responsibility for the upbringing of children.
After an unfavorable ruling in Roloff Evangelistic Enterprises, Inc. v.
State, 556 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), appeal dismissed, 99 S. Ct.
58, 601 (1978), the homes were brought directly under the control of
Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church.

The State of Texas brought suit

against the church in State v. Corpus Christi People's Baptist Church,
Inc., Cause No. 297,248 (200th Jud. Dist. Ct. 1981 ).

In a memorandum

dated April 17, 1981, Judge Charles D. Mathews, after noting the
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longevity and great expense of the continuing controversy, concluded
that the sole issue was the constitutionality of the law as applied to
the facilities and operations of that church.
defendants.

He ruled in favor of the

No further rulings have been made in this case since that

date but the case is by no means concluded.

26

The lack of a clear pattern is apparent in related cases that have
been decided elsewhere.

A South Carolina court rejected as vague a

state child welfare requirement covering programs and community
activities as it had been applied to a religious children's home.

But

the Kansas Supreme Court ruled against a minister who operated an
unlicensed home for unwed mothers and upheld the state's power to
require disclosure of records and to enforce rules regarding discipline
.

an d f lnances.

27

The licensing of day care centers, often so broadly defined as to
include church nurseries, is another point of contention.

The North

Carolina Supreme Court refused an appeal by several churches regarding
the licensing of their day care facilites in Fayetteville Street
Christian School v. North Carolina, 299 N.C. 351, 261 S.E. 2d 908
(1980).

Other states have adopted similar regulations:

Recently, the Ohio Department of Public Welfare published a new set
of "proposed Rules Governing Licensure of Day Care Centers." These
rules purpose to license and control all church nurseries, Sunday
Schools, Vacation Bible Schools, "church-operated" day cares, and
"church-operated" preschools. These rules would make the Welfar2
8
Department the governing Board over all these church activities.
On the other hand, Arkansas exempts religious child care facilities from
its general licensing requirement.
The reasons given for these new regulations are usually plausible.
The desire to reduce litigation for negligence, to restrain rising
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insurance costs, or to prevent the recurrence of well-publicized
misfortunes is difficult to gainsay.
stake.

Yet other values are also at

The question that must be addressed is whether limits on these

regulations can be set and enforced for the sake of civil and religious
liberty.

Negligence and fraud, for example, are punishable offenses.

Elaborate regulations designed to prevent their occurrence may be highly
intrusive.

The issue is not simply one of finding a balance between

competing public and private goods.

Such regulations create

entanglements that raises the question whether the concept of limited
government--something limited by guarantees more concrete than the will
of a temporary legislative, judicial, or popular majority--has gone by
the boards.

If so, is there any security that a beneficent system of

social regulations will not become self-serving?

If the law is nothing

but the prevailing standards of the community, what is to prevent the
continual redefinition of those standards in favor a new coalition of
interests?

These are some of the concerns that have motivated some

churches and pastors to resist what may on the surface appear to be
inconsequential intrusions or minor inconveniences.

They perceive that

the power to define the ministry of the church involves the power to
establish, restrict, or regulate it.
Police Powers and Public Services
The jurisdictional controversy between church and state in regard
to social regulations turns on the proper nature and scope of the police
power.

The interest of the state in the health, safety, and morals of

its citizens is well-established in law.

Ernst Freund, who wrote an
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early treatise on the police power, recommended that two factors be
weighed in determining the validity of specific regulations as applied
to religious organizations: whether an element of discrimination is
involved and whether arbitrary discretion is vested in administrative
officials. 29

He also believed it "to be the constitutional duty of

public authorities to reconcile, as far as their discretion allows,
civic and religious obligation."

30

While he did not believe that

conflicts between civic and religious duties need always be decided in
favor of religion, Freund minimized the potential for conflict: "The
constitutions provide that religious freedom shall not excuse practices
inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state; but such a provision
does not cover cases where the peace and safety of the state are not
concerned, and where the conduct complained of is not a positive
practice, but an omission to act."

31

Police functions were originally vested in local governments,
particularly counties.

As James Willard Hurst observed, the law assumed

an active character in the nineteenth century and served as an
instrument for the release of energy.

Chief Justice Roger Taney

regarded the police power as an attribute of sovereignty and equated the
two at each level of government.

But Judge Learned Hand later commented

that, so understood, the police power was--by its very lack of
definition--unbounded.

32

The perennial problem in regard to regulation is to divine where
the interests of the state outweigh the interests of specific groups or
individuals.

The Constitution allowed ample liberty for various

interests--social, individual, political, religious, economic, national,
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and local--to adjust to each other.

The founders sought to preserve

liberty by placing definite constitutional limits on the sphere of
national and state activity.

In the event that changes should prove

necessary, constitutional remedies were provided.

But a passage in the

Farewell Address of President George Washington speaks directly to this
issue and carries with it a warning:
If, in the opinion of the People, the distribution or modification
of the Constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be
corrected by an amendment in the way which the constitution
designates.--But let there be no change by usurpation; for though
this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the
customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed.--The
precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any
partial ~3 transient benefit which the use can at any time
yield.-American political history may be profitably studied as a practical
commentary on the hazards of "change through usurpation."

Ideological

and practical considerations have been equally prominent in bringing
these changes to pass.

Francis J. Powers, for example, later noted the

impact of a changing philosophy of law on American jurisprudence and
traced its roots:
While Montesquieu is acknowledged as the intellectual forerunner of
sociological jurisprudence, its greatest practical impetus was
provided by the German pioneer, Rudolph von Ihering whose thesis
was that the protection of individual rights was dictated primarily
by social considerations and that rights were essentially nothing
more than legally protected social interests. Individual welfare,
in his thought, was never an end in itself, but was recognized ~nly
3
because it aided in the securing of the larger social welfare.
Such a view has consequences that eventually diverge from a view
that lays the strongest emphasis on individual welfare.

In a day of

electronic banking and sophisticated computer crime, direct surveillance
and the monitoring of communications systems, for example, may be not
only technically feasible but also be politically acceptable if the sole
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consideration is the larger social welfare as policy-makers define it.
Although the preference by public officials for individual privacy and
personal liberty does not need to be doubted, new technological
circumstances have greatly magnified the costs of both negligence and
criminal activity.

A desire to take precautionary measures against

potential abuses is understandable.

But the remedy provided under a

limited constitution is to punish violators of the law rather than to
monitor people's daily activities to ensure their compliance with it.
Health and Safety
Traditionally, police powers took the form of outright prohibitions
rather than detailed regulations.

They dealt with matters of urgent

public concern, such as the preservation of public health, safety,
welfare, morals, and peace.
Health and safety considerations, for example, are typically viewed
under the aspect of compelling state interest.

Contagious diseases pose

such a clear and present danger to the community that the courts have
disregarded religious objections to inoculations.

Conscientious issues

have also been raised about blood transfusions and extraordinary
life-preserving techniques, usually to little avai1.
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But the state's

insistence that its police powers be extended to questions of social
policy, such as hiring practices, classroom discipline, and various
antidiscrimination laws, have led to doubts in some religious circles
that religious liberty is adequately protected under the First
Amendment.
The most publicized health and safety issues affecting religious
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liberty--such as snake handling, faith healing, and sacramental uses of
drugs--should not be considered most representative.

The courts have

uniformly ruled the first as a public nuisance, upheld the second only
when a threat to life was not involved, and upheld the third only in the
case of traditional Native American rites.
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But when the state insists

that that a church maintain health records, or that a church school
require inoculations of its students, does it cross the line into
impermissible intrusion?

Few churches voice any objection to

complying with building and fire codes but confusion may result when
standards applied to a building during Sunday worship services are held
to be inadequate for weekday school sessions ..
Zoning
Another application of police powers is through zoning ordinances
and land use planning laws, which have become major policy-making tools
in recent decades.
era,
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Not unlike the restrictive covenants of a bygone

exclusive residential zoning has at times been used to keep out

or otherwise restrict churches and religious communes.

At other times,

some congregations have been excluded because of neighborhood plans that
deliberately restrict the number of churches and allow them to be built
only on a "first come, first served" basis.

This device was used, for

example, to prevent the newly formed First Orthodox Presbyterian Church
of Portland, Oregon from remaining in its original neighborhood.
church was required to move.
filling station.

The

Its old property was converted into a
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Zoning is also used to restrict ministries that are conducted by
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churches on their own property.

Sometimes a variance or re-zoning must

be sought, along with a special license, if a church opens a day care
f acl•l•t
l y. 39

But so far, the most serious problems to develop have

involved churches seeking to use their facilities during the week for a
school.

Many churches believe that education is a proper ministry of

the church and should be treated as such.

In City of Concord v. New

Testament Baptist, 382 A.2d 377 (1977), the New Hampshire Supreme Court
ruled in favor of the church on this matter.
But the New Hampshire decision was not accepted as a precedent by
the Court of Appeals in Oregon in a similar case in Damascus, Oregon.
The issues in this case revolved around the meaning of the original
conditional use permit the church obtained in 1967.

In the fall of

1975, a complaint brought to the attention of the Clackamas Planning
Commission the fact that a school had been started on the church
premises.

The commission told the church that an additional conditional

use permit was required for the operation of a school.

The church

submitted an application, but was turned down because a minimum
acres of property was required.

12~

The case went through a series of

appeals until it reached the Oregon Court of Appeals in the fall of
1977.

The Court ruled in favor of the church on the acreage question

and on another issue relating to sewage and traffic, but it upheld the
Commission in denying the additional conditional use permit.

The case

went back to the Clackamas County Circuit Court, which determined in
January of 1979 that the "the Damascus Christian School is an integral
and inseparable part of the Damascus Community Church and, further, that
Damascus Community Church's original and current conditional use permit
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is sufficient to encompass its school operation."
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The Board of County

Commissioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed this
decision in April of the following year.

After the United States

Supreme Court declined to take up the case, the church applied for and
this time was granted a conditional use permit.

The six years of

litigation settled nothing, but it did demonstrate the vulnerability of
churches when land use regulations are involved.
Churches that meet in private residences have been taken to court,
although a young congregation typically gets started this way.
home Bible studies and prayer sessions have been challenged.

Even
In Los

Angeles, a supervisor for the Department of Building and Safety "stated
that it will be the Department's policy to issue cease and desist orders
against any religious meeting in a private home not zoned for church use
even if 'just one' non-resident is present."
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This matter was later

resolved through a letter to the mayor's office.
have been reported elsewhere.
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Similar restrictions

These may be isolated cases but they

have created considerable consternation within church circles.

The

question is whether these conflicts are the natural outcome of an
increasing emphasis on detailed land use planning.

The possible social

consequences have long been a matter of controversy.
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Religious Uses of Public Property
The use of public property for religious activities raises other
issues.

A number of earlier court decisions that have prohibited the

use of public property for religious meetings and Christmas displays may
have to be reversed in light of Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981 ),
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and Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984).
yet to be challenged.

But some practices have

For example, many churches rent in state-owned

facilities, including public schools, for their worship services.

This

has been made an issue in some places.
Public activities that survive court challenges are usually those
that have come to be recognized as cultural artifacts despite their
religious origins.

But the disestablishment of state churches has not

necessarily meant the disestablishment of religion.
has come to be secularized.

In effect, religion

The new meaning of religion is illustrated

by a comment in a 1982 issue of Time: "Christmas trees, for example, are
generally considered secular because of their origin in pagan rituals.
Public school Christmas pageants have won court approval as long as the
cultural significance outweighed the religious."
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There are numerous

logical difficulties with this position, not the least of which are the
semantic ones.

If a religious practice is acceptable because it is

pagan, does it not thereby gain an advantage over the religious practice
of a recognized religion?

The entire history of the Christian Church

could be studied in terms of its struggle to root out paganism from its
midst.

If paganism can return through the back door because of its

cultural value, then it would seem to enjoy all the advantages of free
exercise and none of the restrictions of the free exercise clause.
But the confusion over what is a sectarian as opposed to a secular
practice appears to reach into the Court itself.

In Lynch v. Donnelly,

104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984), Chief Justice Burger denied the implication that
by upholding the public display of a Christmas manger scene the Court
was seeking to explain away its religious significance or equating "the
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creche with a Santa's house or a talking wishing well."

Justice

Brennan, however, wrote in his dissent that "it is plainly contrary to
the purposes and values of the Establishment Clause to pretend, as the
Court does, that the otherwise secular setting of Pawtucket's nativity
scene dilutes in some fashion the creche's singular religiosity, or that
the City's display reflects nothing more than an 'acknowledgment' of our
shared national heritage" (104 S.Ct. 135, 1373).
Neither side really came to grips with the public role that
religion may play in an officially secular society.

It is not clear

whether this single case represents more than a momentary weathervane or
whether it signals a definite trend away from the Lemon test.

But as

long as the Court continues to pay lip service to the idea of a high and
impregnable wall of separation, litigation may be expected to cover the
entire range of possible entanglements.

If the Court ever decided that

the separationist principle dictates that religious activities must be
banished from public property, then a long line of rulings, including
Niemotko, Poulos, and Widmar cases, would be affected.
It is difficult to gather from the Court's rulings, however, what
principles govern its most recent actions.

For example, it is unclear

why the religious display in the Lynch case might be more objectionable
to some of the justices than the practice of renting booths at county
and states fairs to religious organizations.

In Heffron v.

International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640
(1981 ), the Court upheld a Minnesota State Fair rule previously struck
down by the Minnesota Supreme Court that governed the distribution of
merchandise and held that members of the sect may be restricted to their
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booths while distributing or selling their religious literature.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun dissented with respect
to the distribution of literature, and later dissented together in the
Lynch case, but were also willing to accept reasonable regulations in
the interests of crowd control and concurred with the Court's decision.
They joined in the Widmar ruling which upheld the right of student
religious groups to meet on a university campus.

Later, they were

joined by Justice Powell in a charitable solicitation case, Larsen v.
Valente, 102 S.Ct. 1673 (1982), in which they stipulated that
regulations may not be based on any preference for one religious
denomination over another.

The dissenters objected that the

requirements for standing had not been met and that the identity of the
Unification Church as a religious organization had not been established.
These decisions illustrate the weaknesses that are increasingly
evident in both the separationist and the accommodationist positions.
Separationists appear to be willing to uphold a secular regulation that
circumscribes the free exercise of religion particularly in order to
avoid the appearance of an establishment of religion but are unwilling
to permit an official preference of one religion over another and appear
to be unwilling to permit an official determination of the character or
claims of a religion.

Accommodationists appear to be less concerned

about the appearance of an establishment of religion so long as
neutrality is respected but are generally willing to permit the
examination and supervision of a religious organization involved in a
general regulation or subsidy.
To date, the Court has proven unwilling to banish religious
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activities from public property altogether.

Although it has not

prohibited religious activities by public school students on school
premises, lower court decisions have gone both ways on the issue.

Equal

access legislation has been introduced into Congress that would cut off
federal grants unless schools permit voluntary student religious
meetings.
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Yet uncertainties remain because of the tension between the

separationist rhetoric and the generally accommodationist effect of the
Court's decisions.

Issues of religious liberty has consequently became

even more highly politicized in the absence of a clear constitutional
standard.

One result is that conflicts between religious liberty and

compelling state interest are reduced to a balancing act.

Should the

Court's rulings ever match its rhetoric, however, the results could be
far reaching.

Public property represents a vast domain that is

effectively enlarged through land use planning and the power of eminent
domain.

Restrictions on religious uses of public and private property

would raise constitutional of the first magnitude.

The separationist

and accommodationist positions might be strengthened by a careful study
of the means by which religious liberty has been lost in other places as
well as other times.

In both Mexico and the Soviet Union, church

property is owned by the state and can be withheld from religious uses
or otherwise regulated to suit its purposes.
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Employment
Four major categories of issues relating to employment are the
provision of unemployment benefits, the payment of unemployment taxes,
the supervision of union elections, and the prohibition of various types
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of discrimination, which is treated in a separate section.

Judicial

doctrine regarding unemployment benefits is fairly well settled in favor
of accommodating those who lose their jobs or refuse to take jobs
because of religious scruples.

In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana

Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981 ), the Supreme Court
awarded unemployment benefits to a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses who
was denied benefits because he quite his job after being transfered to a
department that fabricated turrets for military tanks.

Basing the

Court's decision on the Sherbert and Yoder precedents, Chief Justice
Burger limited the application of the compelling state interest: "The
state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is
the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest"
(450 U.S. 707, 718).

So far, however, the Court has applied this

rationale only in cases involving unemployment benefits and compulsory
school attendance.
Under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), religious
organizations are exempt from any liability to pay unemployment taxes.
After the Department of Labor extended coverage to church-affiliated
schools and even supported state legislation to that affect, the Court
held in St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S.
772 (1981), that this exemption also applies to schools that do not have
a separate legal existence from a church.

But in California v. Grace

Brethren Church, 102 S.Ct. 2498 (1982), the Court vacated and remanded a
lower court ruling that FUTA was unconstitutional as applied to
religious schools unaffiliated with churches on the grounds that the
state, which administers this cooperative federal-state program, had
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jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act.
The Court has also accommodated religious organizations by
rejecting the extension of collective bargaining requirements to
church-affiliated schools.

In National Labor Relations Board v.

Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 99 S.Ct. 1313 (1979), and again in National
Labor Relations Board v. Yeshiva University, 100 S.Ct. 856 (1980), the
Court narrowly construed the scope of the National Labor Relations Act
of 1935 and refused to uphold the petitioner's claim that it exercised
jurisdiction over the lay faculty members of church-operated schools,
who had voted to unionize under elections supervised by the board.
Chief Justice Burger noted in the Catholic Bishop case that the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) did not assert jurisdiction over private
schools until 1970, when it "pointed to what it saw as an increased
involvement in commerce by educational institutions and concluded that
this required a different position on jurisdiction" (99 S.Ct. 1313,
1317).

Justice Brennan, who wrote for the dissenters, replied that it

is not the place of the Court to remake a law in order to save it from
conflict with a constitutional limitation and concluded that ''while the
resolution of the constitutional question is not without difficulty, it
is irresponsible to avoid it by a cavalier exercise in statutory
interpretation which succeeds only in defying congressional intent" (99
S.Ct. 1313, 1328).

Although he declined to address the religious

liberty question, Justice Brennan indicated the probable outcome of a
decision on that ground by citing Associated Press v. National Labor
Relations Board, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).

The majority in the earlier case

had construed the act to cover the employees of a nonprofit
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news-gathering organization despite First Amendment objections.

Justice

Sutherland wrote a memorable dissent in that case:
Do the people of this land--in the providence of God, favored, as
they sometimes boast, above all others in the plenitude of their
liberties--desire to preserve those so carefully protected by the
First Amendment: liberty of religious worship, freedom of speech
and of the press, and the right as free men peaceably to assemble
and petition their government for a redress of grievances? If so,
let them withstand all beginnings of encroachment. For the saddest
epitaph which can be carved in memory of a ravished liberty is that
it was lost because its possessors failed to stretch forth a saving
hand while yet there was time (301 U.S. 103, 141 ).
Discrimination
In an avowedly egalitarian society, perhaps the greatest conflicts
may be found where competing demands for social consensus and social
pluralism converge.

Until recently, education and proselytism were

nearly alone in being the most sensitive areas of judicial concern
because they raised or stood in for fundamental doctrinal issues.
Regulations that restrict religious liberty by making the expression of
faith or dissent more difficult tend to be regarded as encroachments
into a private domain.

Although the frontiers between church, state,

and family are poorly marked in places, they appear to be heavily
patrolled.
But a third issue, social discrimination, is quickly coming to
equal the other two in sensitivity and potential for mischief.
it may prove to be the most intractable issue of all.

In fact,

The reason for

this is that, as yet, the power of Congress to legislate in this domain
has been virtually unlimited.

Twenty years ago Congress passed the

first of a series of broad civil rights reforms that addressed various
forms of public and private discrimination.

In Heart of Atlanta Motel
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v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964), the Court ruled that the Congress was free to seek to
eliminate racial discrimination through the use of its plenary power to
regulate interstate commerce.

But commerce was defined so broadly that

the effect of the ruling was to extend this power even over arguably
private activities.
Since then, other forms of social discrimination have come under
attack through a variety of federal employment, housing, and education
laws.

Although churches have sometimes been granted exemptions where

concerns about religious liberty have been raised, these exemptions are
exceptional and often conditional.

One area of special concern to

churches is any social classification based on religion or creed,
whether for the purposes of discrimination or eliminating
discrimination.
Employment Opportunity
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA), which is Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."

Religious

organizations are exempted from full compliance with the EEOA only "with
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to
perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational institution, or society of its activities." 47
An amendment in 1972 broadened the exemption to include all activities
of a religious organization, not just those which are identified as
. .

re 1 lglOUS.

48

Jeanmarie S. Brock and Harvey G. Brown, Jr., however, have
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pointed out that Senator John Williams, who was a spokesman for the 1972
amendment, wished to restrict this exemption with respect to "religious
corporations and associations, such as hospitals, that provide purely
secular services to the general public without regard to religious
affilation." 49

The question of the constitutionality of this

restriction as applied to religious organizations has yet to be
addressed by the Court.
Cases involving charges of sex and race discrimination have
occasionally gone unfavorably against religious organizations, although
no definitive ruling has been made to date.

Racial discrimination has

regarded least favorably of all but in instances where discrimination on
any basis other than race has been charged, the courts have ruled either
way.
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mississippi College,
626 F.2d (5th Cir. 1980), the court vacated a lower court's finding of
fact and held that the EEOC lacks jurisdiction over religious
discrimination.

The case involved a female, Presbyterian clinical

psychologist who was employed part-time by the college as an assistant
professor and sued the college after the full-time faculty position for
which she had applied was filled by a male, Baptist experimental
psychologist.

The school had a written policy favoring the hiring of

active Baptists as full-time faculty members.

Another court ruled in

favor of a church which had fired the congregation's recently hired
organist when it learned that he was a practicing homosexual who refused
to repent. 50
But in Dolter v. Wahlert High School, 483 F.Supp. 266 (N.D. Iowa
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1980), the court upheld the jurisdiction of EEOC when an unmarried
teacher who had become pregnant was fired by a Roman Catholic high
school, allegedly only because she was pregnant.

It held that even if

the school's code of moral conduct constitutes a "bona fide occupational
qualification," it may not be applied unequally to male and female lay
teachers.

In effect, it ruled that the sexes must be treated

identically by religious organizations as well as by secular ones. 51

In

King's Garden v. Federal Communications Commission, 498 F.2d 51
(D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974), the court upheld a ruling
by the FCC that radio stations operated by the licensee, a Christian
ministry, discriminated on religious grounds in its employment
practices.

It asserted that the 1972 amendment to the EEOA exempting

religious discrimination by sectarian employers was of doubtful
constitutionality.
The potential of such regulations for interference with religious
liberty, even if they are construed narrowly, is unimaginable because
their applications are often unpredictable.

Speaking of a Christian

school case involving discrimination charges, William Ball criticized
for overbreadth the Ohio statute in question, which made it an "unlawful
discriminatory practice" for any employer"'·

. because of the . . .

religion [or] sex . . . of any person to refuse to hire, or otherwise to
discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or
indirectly related to employment.' n 52

Under the terms of this law, he

noted that a Lutheran congregation could not refuse to hire as a pastor
someone from a different faith and a seminary for the Catholic
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priesthood could not refuse to hire a woman as an instructor.

Far from

being remote possibilities, however, all that legally stands in the way
of such requirements is the absence of a definitive ruling on the
constitutionality of religion-based exemptions.
The Bob Jones University Case
So far, the sharpest line that has been drawn is over racial
discrimination by tax-exempt organizations, including religious ones.
The stir that was raised over alleged discrimination by President Jimmy
Carter's home church in Plains, Georgia brought national attention to
focus on the problem of racial exclusivism in churches.
By that time, the Supreme Court had already addressed the issue in
the Norwood case and first of two decisions involving Bob Jones
University of Greenville, South Carolina.

Like the Americans United

case, which was decided the same day, Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416
U.S. 725 (1974), was a suit "for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax" which, according to the terms of
the Anti-Injunction Act of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, was
expressly prohibited.

The university had been founded in 1927,

originally in Florida, for the purpose of teaching and propagating
fundamentalist religious beliefs.

One of its distinctive beliefs is

that the Bible forbids miscegenation.

"On pain of expulsion students

are prohibited from interracial dating, and petitioner believes that it
would be impossible to enforce this prohibition absent the exclusion of
Negroes" (416 U.S. 725, 735).

In 1970, the IRS announced that it would

no longer allow §501 (c) (3) status for private schools maintaining
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racially discriminatory admissions policies.

After the university

stated it had no intention of altering its policy of excluding
nonwhites, the IRS began taking steps to revoke its §501 (c)(3) ruling
letter.

The Court unanimously upheld the lower court's refusal to issue

an injunction.

But Justice Powell, who wrote for the Court, also called

attention to the severity of the current revocation procedure:
A former Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service has sharply
criticized the system applicable to such organizations. The degree
of bureaucratic control that, practically speaking, has been placed
in the Service over those in petitioner's position is susceptible
of abuse, regardless of how conscientiously the Service may attempt
to carry out its responsibilities. Specific treatment of
not-for-profit organizations to allow them to seek pre-enforcement
review may well merit consideration. But this matter is for
Congress . . . " (416 U.S. 725, 749-50).
The university meanwhile had taken steps, beginning in 1971, to
admit Negroes married within their race.

A month after IRS notified it

of the proposed revocation of its tax-exempt status, the university
began permitting unmarried Negroes to enroll but still prohibited
interracial dating and marriage.

In January of the following year, its

tax exemption was officially revoked effective as of December 1, 1970,
the day after the university was formally notified of the change in IRS
policy.

The university filed an unemployment tax return, paid a nominal

sum of $21 .00, requested a refund, and brought suit after the refund was
refused.

The government brought a countersuit for $489,675.59 plus

interest for unpaid federal unemployment taxes.
A federal district court ruled in favor of the university in Bob
Jones University v. United States, 468 F.Supp. 890 (1978) on the grounds
that the exemption applies generally to religious organizations:
The fact that plaintiff is not affiliated with any denomination,
yet, at the same time, is totally guided by its fundamentalist
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beliefs, attests that plaintiff is a distinct religious
organization in and of itself. Plaintiff is not an educational
appendage of a recognized church that may allude in its educational
processes to the beliefs of the parent religious order. Instead,
the organizational source of plaintiff's religious beliefs is the
university. The convictions of plaintiff's faith do not merely
guide its curriculum but, more importantly, dictate for it the
truth therein. Bob Jones University cannot be termed a sectarian
school, for it composes its own religious order (468 F.Supp. 890,
895).
The district judge criticized the argument used by two other
district courts "that tax exemptions were not intended to be granted to
organizations which violate public policy" (468 F.Supp. 890, 902) .
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This argument was based on the Supreme Court's opinion in Tank Truck
Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1978), which disallowed the
deduction of fines as a business expense because it would "encourage
violation of declared public policy."

But in the Bob Jones case, the

court held that "the judicially created 'public policy' limitation is
much restricted and not applicable to situations . . . where the
relationship between the tax benefit and the proscribed conduct is
tenuous."

Such a rule renders the exemption itself equally tenuous and

disrupts fundraising:
According to defendant's application of the public policy
limitation expressed in Tank Truck, exempt status would be denied
to any church that somehow committed a violation of a federal
statute, a recognized expression of declared federal policy,
because defendant's theory requires no showing of any relation
between conferal of the exemption and frustration of the federal
policy (468 F.Supp. 890, 903-04).
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, reversed this
decision and upheld two others against the university in Bob Jones
University v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980) in a split
decision.

The majority cited several earlier Supreme Court decisions,

including the Norwood case and Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1975),

573
which held that the equal right to contract prohibits racial
discrimination in nonpublic school admissions policies.

It also applied

the public policy limitation to assure "that Americans will not be
providing indirect support for any educational organization that
discriminates on the basis of race. . . .

The fact that the religious

belief is sincere, and the policy immutable in this case does not
obviate the need for a prophylactic rule to prevent such support" (639
F.2d 147, 152-53).

The dissenting judge, however, maintained that a tax

exemption "has not only the protection of the First Amendment, but its
authorization" and cited the Walz case to the effect that the "grant of
a tax exemption is not sponsorship" (397 U.S. 664, 675).

He disagreed

with the majority's analysis:
. we are dealing in this case not with the right of the
government to interfere in the internal affairs of a school
operated by a church, but with the internal affairs of the church
itself. There is no difference in this case between the
government's right to take away Bob Jones' tax exemption and the
government's right to take away the exemption of a church which has
a rule of its internal doctrine or discipline based on race,
although that church may not operate a school at all. In this
opinion, I speak not to the abstract wisdom or rightness of such a
rule, but to the right of a church to enforce that rule, although
it may be repugnant to most of the population, if the rule is a
part of its religious doctrine or discipline" (639 F.2d 147, 156).
Noting that discriminatory racial and sexual practices by some of the
oldest and largest churches were implicated under this interpretation,
he implicitly criticized the IRS for not choosing to attack the problem
from a broader angle "so as to get it settled for the whole country."
He also disagreed that Congress had meant to invoke the law of
charitable trusts when it designated "charitable" as one of several
categories of exempt organizations under §501 (c) (3).
The numerous law review articles split on the issue.

Karla Simon
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wrote that "it has become increasingly apparent that segregated
sectarian schools are a major inhibiting factor in the growth of fully
integrated educational systems throughout the nation" .and concluded that
an exemption for religious schools would violate the establishment
clause.
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David Anderson contended that Congress had already endorsed

the rationale for denying tax exemptions to racially discriminatory
schools.

He criticized the numerous bills that had been introduced to

prohibit a final issuance of the new revenue procedures of August 22,
1978 but also expressed concern over "the injury which the IRS could do
to private religious education if the procedures it has proposed were
used improvidently." 55

Thomas Neuberger and Thomas Crumplar recommended

that Congress take the task of enforcing public policy out of the hands
of administrative agencies, specify that exemptions constitute federal
financial assistance in the limited case of discriminatory educational
institutions, and "establish a method by which the discriminatory
admissions policies of private schools could be challenged in judicial,
rather than administrative, proceedings.'' 56
The case became a major public issue when the Reagan Administration
first tried to end the public policy limitation, then tried to have it
formalized by Congress. 57
intense.

Lobbying on both sides of the issue was

The controversy settled down within a couple of months after

the Supreme Court agreed to take up the case.

More than a year later it

upheld the public policy limitation in Bob Jones University v. United
States and a companion case, Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United
States, 103 S.Ct. 2017 (1983).
Chief Justice Burger, who wrote for the Court, drew heavily on the
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common law of charitable trusts where a gift is devoted to public
charitable uses.

He urged the same public benefit theory regarding tax

exemption that he rejected earlier in the Walz case, although he did not
repudiate that decision:
When the Government grants exemptions or allows deductions all
taxpayers are affected; the very fact of the exemption or deduction
for the donor means that other taxpayers can be said to be indirect
and vicarious "donors." Charitable exemptions are justified on the
basis that the exempt entity confers a public benefit--a benefit
which the society or the community may not itself choose or be able
to provide, or which supplements and advances the work of public
institutions already supported by tax revenues" (103 S.Ct. 2017,
2028).
But he qualified this ruling by stating in a footnote: "We deal here
only with religious schools--not with churches or other purely religious
institutions; here, the governmental interest is in denying public
support to racial discrimination in education" (103 S.Ct. 2017, 2035
n29).
Justice Powell, who concurred, was "troubled by the broader
implications of the Court's opinion' with regard to the authority of IRS
and found it inappropriate "to leave the IRS 'on the cutting edge of
developing national policy'" (103 S.Ct. 2017, 2039).

He agreed with

Justice Rehnquist, who dissented, that the language of the Internal
Revenue Code itself does not require a refusal of tax exemption on the
grounds cited but concluded that recent history had in effect created a
precedent.

He disagreed particularly with the public benefit argument

and found it impossible to believe that all exempt organizations could
demonstrate that they serve and are in harmony with the public interest.
He was also unwilling to say that the university "necessarily
contributed nothing of benefit to the community."

But he directed his
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strongest argument against the implication that an exempt organization
is meant to serve as an agent of the state:
The Court asserts that an exempt organization must "demonstrably
serve and be in harmony with the public interest," must have a
purpose that comports with "the common community conscience," and
must not act in a manner "affirmatively at odds with [the] declared
position of the whole government." Taken together, these passages
suggest that the primary function of a tax-exempt organization is
to act on behalf of the Government in carrying out governmentally
approved policies. In my opinion, such a view of §501 (c)(3)
ignores the important role played by tax exemptions in encouraging
diverse, indeed often sharply conflicting, activities and
viewpoints (103 S.Ct. 2017, 2038).
Unfortunately for this view, however, the Court had already used
pluralism as an argument for restricting exemptions in the Lee case and
had determined that exemptions are subsidies in the Taxation With
Representation case.

As long as an exemption is regarded as a subsidy

or an act of grace, rather than as an immunity, its tendency is to
create an establishment of religion--whether through consensus or
pluralism--either by sustaining a "common community conscience" or by
"encouraging diverse

activities and viewpoints."

If the

establishment implications of tax exemption are unavoidable, however,
then the nature of the preferred establishment must be forthrightly
addressed.
Justice Rehnquist simply maintained that this was a matter for
Congress itself to decide.

He rejected the public policy requirement

and cited with approval the statement of Congressman Ashbrook, whose
amendment denied IRS the authority to create a national policy
respecting denial of tax exemptions to private schools: "There exists
but a single responsibility which is proper for the Internal Revenue
Service: 'To serve as tax collector"' (103 S.Ct. 2017, 2044).
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A month after the Bob Jones decision, a federal district court
granted a summary judgment for the plaintiffs in a case involving the
tax-exempt status of church-related schools in Mississippi.

An earlier

injunction setting up guidelines to ensure compliance with a ruling
against racial discrimination was challenged by a church which objected
to the requirement that private schools recruit students and faculty
from minority groups. 58

Four months later, the Superior Court for the

District of Columbia held that the District's human rights act could not
be used to compel Georgetown University to recognize two homosexual
student organizations in the absence of a state interest of sufficient
magnitude to justify a burden on the free exercise of religion.

But it

also pointed out that, unlike racial discrimination, a firm national
policy with regard to sexual orientation was lacking. 59
As for Bob Jones University itself, it has acquiesced in the ruling
and does not anticipate further litigation.

It now has the distinction

of being the only college in the country that is not exempt from taxes.
Conclusion
Even assuming that religious exemptions are ultimately upheld, at
least in principle, religious organizations are likely to continue to
bear the onus of proving that they are acting in good faith.

When a

religious group must be exempted from innumerable laws of general
application, including various taxes, licenses, and laws against
discrimination, it is quite possible that this signifies not so much its
privileged position as its isolation from the normal commerce of daily
life.

The position of a mendicant is always tenuous.

When religion is
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placed in that position, its place in society is far from assured.

If

the history of Indian treaties and the breakup of Indian reservations
are any indication, the consequent isolation and powerlessness do not
have to be deliberately sought out by a social group.

A special status

can be a means of subjugation when it does not carry with it effective
political power.

The privileges, such as they are, can be effectively

choked off in the tangle of additional amendments, interpretations, and
exceptions.
It is not only restrictions but the exemptions themselves that may
be described as as ''prophylactic."

They may represent the political

equivalent of a quarantine against practices the lawmakers have chosen
to condemn.

Law does not persuade; it compels.

integrate, it tends to isolate.

Where it does not

Therein lies much of its power.

The

historical movement of the law from relationships based on status to
contract seems to have been diverted into new status channels.

Laws

that are not generally applicable are inherently discriminatory.

The

awarding or denying of exemptions may be temporarily expedient but they
do little if anything to resolve the contradictions they conceal.
The same question faces both church and state: By what standard are
they to be governed?

Until this issue is settled and a common ground is

reached, the power of the state to regulate is likely to dominate the
relationship.

But the balancing of irreconcilable political and

religious interpretations of constitutional values is a phenomenon that
is most characteristic of transitions.

Sooner or later the hard choices

between them must be made and will be enforced.
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